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INTRODUCTION

The 2000 presidential election had a searing effect on this
nation. Few who witnessed the events in Florida could displace
the images of election officials peering at punch cards, struggling
to determine the intent of voters. Congress, for example, did not
forget. Congress did not wish to see the scenes from Florida
replayed in future elections. And so, in 2002, it enacted the Help
America Vote Act, known as "HAVA," which provided $325
million to the states to replace their punch card voting systems.'
Many states have enthusiastically embraced this invitation,
replacing punch cards with electronic voting machines, known as
direct recording electronic devices (DREs). Given the rapidly
approaching 2006 deadline to upgrade, other states are currently
considering such activity.
In the rush to solve one problem, however, states may be
creating another, far greater, one. To be sure, DREs relieve
election officials of the challenge of ascertaining the voters'
intent. They also allow for expeditious counting, have the
capability to reduce "undervotes" and "overvotes," and promise to
increase access for voters with disabilities. These benefits have
been touted by election officials-Democrats and Republicans
alike-who have adopted DREs.
But outside the computer science community, the full
panoply of dangers from such systems has avoided scrutiny. This
Article attempts to remedy this deficiency. In particular, it
underscores several disturbing characteristics of electronic
voting, including the following:
(1) Reduced transparency. Unlike boxes of paper ballots
that materialize after the polls close, a hidden trap door in
a software program counting millions of votes cannot be
discovered.
(2) Increased magnitude of error and fraud. Because
intangible computer software lacks the physical nature of
paper ballots, it does not offer an upper limit on error and
fraud.
1 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/
p1252_107.pdf.
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(3) Lack of security controls. The refusal to use controls
such as encryption makes it astonishingly easy to change
vote totals, register votes for unintended candidates,
prematurely terminate elections, and erase the "audit log"
that is designed to trace such activity.
I supplement the analysis of the DRE software by examining
vote counting flaws in the 2004 presidential election, including
machine
breakdowns,
vote
totals
that
exceeded
or
underrepresented the number of voters who cast ballots, and
incidents in which the machines switched votes from one
candidate to another (with ninety-eight of ninety-nine reported
incidents involving switches favoring George Bush). I also collect
circumstantial evidence such as exit polls that diverged from the
official vote count to a greater extent than any other election in
the modern era; an incumbent President's surpassing his
standing in pre-election polls by a larger amount than in the past
fifty years; and questionable voting patterns and activity in
states such as Ohio.
Although such evidence does not
automatically prove the existence of error or fraud, it is more
important than ever given the nontransparent nature of the vote
counting process and inability to directly uncover fraud.
I conclude by offering recommendations to improve the
accuracy and verifiability of vote counting today. In particular, I
propose for electronic voting machines a voter-verified paper
trail, random audits, open source software, more robust
certification, and other recommendations.
Only after these
proposals are adopted can voters have confidence that the
promise of vote counting technology will match its perils.

I. VOTING SYSTEMS, ERRORS, AND FRAUD
Five types of voting systems are used in the United States
today. This section briefly introduces the systems and then
explores the types of error and fraud associated with each. It
concludes that the migration from paper ballots and punch cards
to electronic voting, while offering the potential to reduce certain
types of errors, also increases the potential magnitude of error
and fraud and reduces the transparency of vote counting.
A. Voting Systems
Voters in U.S. elections today cast their vote on one of five
types of voting equipment:
paper ballots, mechanical lever
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machines, punch cards, optical scan ballots, and DREs. 2 The
choice of voting technology is decentralized, with each of the
nation's more than 3,100 counties selecting the system it will
3
use.
Paper ballots, the oldest technology, were the only system
used during the first one hundred years of the nation. 4 By the
2004 presidential election, however, they were used by only 0.6%
of the electorate, in approximately three hundred rural counties.
Voters using this system place a mark next to the name of their
preferred candidate on a piece of paper, with the ballots later
5
counted by hand.
Mechanical lever machines were developed in the 1890s.6
Although these machines are no longer manufactured, they are
still employed in several states, with 12.8% of voters using them
in the 2004 election. Voters using the machines enter a voting
booth, close a curtain, flip small levers next to the names of the
preferred candidates, and then pull a large lever that records the
7
vote.
Punch card systems were first employed in 19648 and were
used by 18.6% of the electorate in the 2004 election. In using this
technology, voters employ a stylus to punch out small pieces of
paper-the "chads" of 2000 election fame-from cards with small
pre-scored perforations. 9
Optical scan systems, which are utilized for standardized

OF

2 See HENRY E. BRADY ET AL., COUNTING ALL THE VOTES: THE PERFORMANCE
VOTING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2001), available at

http://ucdata.berkeley.edunew-web/countingallthevotes.pdf;

ERIC

A.

FISCHER,

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, VOTING TECHNOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES

1 (2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/politics/voting/r130773.pdf;
see also Election Assistance Commission, Election Resources, http://www.eac.gov/
election-resources.asp (last visited July 23, 2005) (listing the five types of voting
systems).
3 See FISCHER, supra note 2, at 1; see also BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 10
(noting that in the majority of states, voting systems are chosen by each county).
4 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 2.
5 BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 10; Election Assistance Commission, Paper
Ballots, http://www.eac.gov/election-resources/paper.htm (last visited July 23, 2005).
6 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 3.
7 BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 10; Election Assistance Commission,
Mechanical Lever Machines, http://www.eac.gov/election-resources/lever.htm (last
visited July 23, 2005).
8 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 3.
9 BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 12; Election Assistance Commission,
Punchcards, http://www.eac.gov/election-resources/punchrd.htm (last visited July
23, 2005).
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tests, were first employed for voting in the 1980s10 and were used
by 32.2% of the voters in the 2004 election. Voters using the
technology fill in bubbles on a paper ballot with a pencil or other
writing device. The ballot is then scanned-either within each
precinct or at certain central locations-by a machine that senses
and records the marks.1 1
DRE machines were first introduced in the 1970s 12 and were
The older
used by 28.9% of voters in the 2004 election.
generation of DREs, known as push-button systems, is similar to
lever machines, but employs buttons that record votes
electronically instead of levers. The newer technology, touch
screen systems, allows voters to touch a computer screen to
register their selection. 13
Of the five technologies used today, paper ballots, lever
machines, and punch cards have declined in significance. This
development can be explained in part by Congress's enactment of
14
the Help America Vote Act of 2002, better known as HAVA.
This statute provided $325 million to states that replaced their
punch card and lever voting machines by 2006.15 Only DREs and
some optical scanners fully satisfy the requirements enunciated
16
for voting systems.
B. Errors
The five systems described in the previous section differ in
their error rates. This section describes numerous types of
errors, including "residual votes" and other mishaps reported in
recent elections.
10 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 3.
11 BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 13; Election Assistance Commission,
Marksense, http://www.eac.gov/election-resources/marksnse.htm (last visited July
23, 2005).
12 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 3.
13 BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 13; Election Assistance Commission, Direct
Recording Electronic (DRE), http://www.eac.gov/electionresources/dre.htm (last

visited July 23, 2005).
14 Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/
p1252_107.pdf.
15 Id. § 102 (providing that states must commit to replacing their systems by the
November 2004 election, extendible for good cause to the first general election held
after January 1, 2006).
16 Id. § 301 (setting forth requirements such as voter verification and ability to
correct ballots and access for individuals with disabilities).
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1. Residual Votes
The category of residual votes includes uncounted ballots
(cast by voters but not counted by election officials), undervotes
(in which a voter does not select a candidate for an office), and
overvotes (in which a voter selects too many candidates). 17 Some
of the undervotes, especially in races below the presidential race,
are intentional, as the voter does not intend to vote for a
candidate. But many others-including, according to one study,
one and a half million votes in a typical presidential election18
are unintentional.
The relative performance of the voting technologies has
proven to be consistent in recent years. Nearly all studies have
concluded that punch cards have performed the worst and
precinct-count optical scans and touch-screen DREs have
performed the best in the rates of residual votes. 19
A crucial determinant of the rate of residual votes is the
20
ability to provide feedback to the voter at the time of voting.
Precinct-based optical scans offer this opportunity because the
ballot is fed into a scanner in front of the voter and rejected if it
cannot be read, which allows the voter to remedy any
deficiencies. 21
Similarly, DREs and lever machines can be
programmed to prevent overvotes. In contrast, paper ballots,
punch cards, and centrally-scanned optical scan machines do not
offer this opportunity for feedback to the voter.
2. Other Errors
In addition to residual votes, many other types of errors have
plagued the vote counting process. Although these errors are
17 CALTECHfMIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY

PROJECT, VOTING:

WHAT IS, WHAT

COULD BE 20 (2001), available at http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/
julyO1/July01 VTP VotingReportEntire.pdf [hereinafter CALTECHIMIT STUDY].

Id. at 21.
19 See David C. Kimball, Assessing Voting Methods in 2002, at 28 tbl. 2 (July
2004), available at http://www.umsl.edul-kimballd/dkmpsa2.pdf (finding residual
vote rates in the 2002 gubernatorial elections of 3.5% and 2.8% for two types of
punch cards, 1.3% for precinct-based optical scans, and 1.2% for touch screen DREs);
see also BRADY ET AL., supra note 2, at 29 (finding that punch cards had the highest,
and optical scans the lowest, residual vote rates in the 2000 presidential election).
20 Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625,
635 (2002). This is also a requirement under HAVA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 15481 (West
Supp. 2005).
21 Roger Roy & David Damron, New System Fumbles Votes, ORLANDO
18

SENTINEL, May 6, 2001, at Al.
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often not as capable of precise delineation as residual votes, they
are equally important. This section provides an overview of the
types of errors associated with each of the voting technologies.
Paper ballots are subject to error because of the significant
human element involved in counting ballots. In contrast to the
other technologies, humans play a more important role in
counting, which introduces the possibilities of inattention and
fatigue. 22 On the other hand, each of the other four types of
voting systems is subject to mechanical and other problems not
faced by paper ballots.
Lever machines have "an immense number of moving parts
that are subject to wear." 23 In particular, each time a voter pulls
down a lever, a counter wheel within the machine is turned onetenth of a full rotation.24 Error can result from excessive friction
in the connections. The higher frequency of vote totals ending in
"99"-as compared, for example, to "98" and "00"-suggests that
25
this may have in fact occurred in elections.
The potential range of errors with punch cards was on full
display in the 2000 presidential election in Florida. Punch cards
jammed in readers, chads accidentally fell out, and pre-scored
26
punch cards were not fully removed when pushed with a stylus.
As the 2000 election also revealed, it is difficult to determine the
voter's intent when one or two of the chad's corners are hanging
or when the hole is not completely punched through but is only a
27
"dimpled chad."
Optical scan machines rely on the accuracy of the ballot
reader, which typically uses light or other media as a sensor
detecting the mark. The reader must be sensitive enough to read
the marks without mistaking smudges for votes. It also must
ensure that only one ballot is read at a time. For those ballots
counted at a central location, the delivery to the location
introduces opportunities for error, such as a mixup of ballots
from different precincts. And for precinct-counted ballots, the
22 ROY G. SALTMAN, ACCURACY, INTEGRITY, AND SECURITY IN COMPUTERIZED
VOTE-TALLYING § 3.2.1 (1988), available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/lab/specpubs/500-

158.htm.
23 Douglas W. Jones, A Brief Illustrated History of Voting § 5 (2003),
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-jones/voting/pictures.
24 SALTMAN, supranote 22, § 3.3.
25 See id. § 3.3.2; see also Jones, supra note 23, § 5.
26 SALTMAN, supranote 22, §§ 3.4.1, 3.4.4.
27 Jones, supra note 23, § 6.
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transmission of results over phone lines could lead to
28
inaccuracies.
In recent years, the largest number of errors has
accompanied the use of DREs.
In the 2004 elections, for
example, even though less than 30% of voters used the machines,
at least 60% of reported election incidents concerned DREs. 29
The errors affected machines by all of the major vendors,
including Diebold, Hart Intercivic, Danaher, Electiqcn Systems
and Software (ES&S), and Sequoia, although it especially
30
plagued the latter three.
In large part, this is due to the important role played by, and
questionable performance and security of, software in the
machines. Software is notoriously subject to defects causing
programs to malfunction. It is difficult to pinpoint each of the
software flaws in DREs because the vendors treat the material as
proprietary trade secrets. The likelihood of errors is increased by
hardware defects and lax testing standards. 31
One example of a range of software flaws surfaced when
Diebold left a version of its source code, or list of instructions
causing the computer to operate, on an unprotected Internet
site. 32 Computer scientists obtained access to the code and were
astonished at how poorly it was designed, with one commenting:
"They made mistakes I wouldn't expect an undergraduate in
computer security to make."33 Numerous flaws increase the
likelihood of not only error but also fraud.

28
29

SALTMAN, supra note 22, §§ 3.5, 3.5.1, 3.6.1.
Deirdre Mulligan & Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Preliminary Analysis of E-Voting

Problems Highlights Need for Heightened Standards and Testing, available at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/cstb/project-evoting.html
(follow
"Papers
Received" hyperlink; then follow "Preliminary Analysis of E-Voting" hyperlink) (last
visited July 23, 2005).
30

Id.

These concepts are further developed below. See infra notes 51-60 and
accompanying text.
32 Diebold left 40,000 files, which appeared to correspond to a version of its
voting system. BEV HARRIS, BLACK Box VOTING: BALLOT TAMPERING IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 88 (Talion Publishing 2004), available at http://www.blackboxvoting.org
31

(follow "Chapter 09" hyperlink); TADAYOSHI KOHNO ET AL., ANALYSIS OF AN
ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM 4 (2004), availableat http://avirubin.comvote.pdf.
33 Paul O'Donnell, Broken Machine Politics, WIRED MAG., Jan. 2004, available

at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/evote.html.
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C. Fraud
Each of the five voting technologies used in the United
States today is susceptible to fraud. The types of fraud, however,
differ in their transparency, ease of execution, and potential
magnitude. Along these axes, DREs pose the greatest danger.
1. Non-DRE Technologies
Stories of fraud in the use of paper ballots have appeared for
centuries. Before the introduction in the late nineteenth century
of the "Australian ballot" system-which limits the distribution
of ballots to the polls where voters mark them in secret-ballots
could be transported and candidates often bribed voters for their
34
vote.
Today, there are several ways to compromise paper ballots.
One method is to make additional marks on the ballots for
particular candidates, which subjects those ballots to
invalidation in certain jurisdictions. 35 Another is through a votecounting process in which standards are interpreted by tally
teams "well trained in the selective exclusion of votes for the
opposition." 36 A third type is the well-known "stuffing of the
ballot box," with incidents that famously include:
- The 1948 Democratic Senate primary, in which Lyndon
Johnson trailed his opponent by 854 votes when the polls
closed but gained victory when additional ballots
37
appeared, including 202 votes cast in alphabetical order.
- The 1960 presidential race, in which John Kennedy won
multiple
narrowly amid allegations of ballot stuffing,
38
voting, and voting by dead people in Illinois.
. A 1997 referendum on the construction of a football
stadium for the San Francisco Forty-Niners, in which
more than one hundred ballot boxes-with an abundance
of votes in favor of the proposition-appeared after the
ballots'
polls had closed, with the delay "attributed to 3'wet
9
that needed to be 'dried in a microwave oven."'
34 HARRIS, supra note 32, at 33; SALTMAN, supra note 22, § 3.2.

35 SALTMAN, supra note 22, § 3.2.1.
36 Jones, supra note 23, § 4.
37 HARRIS, supra note 32, at 35.
16,
2000,
Oct.
38 David
Greenberg,
Was Nixon Robbed?, SLATE,
http://slate.msn.com/id/91350 (also noting allegations of Republican fraud in

Illinois).
39 Election Fraudin the 1997 49er Stadium Election: 14 Points of Concern,

10
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These potential instances of fraud may have altered the
outcome in each of the cases. But they are transparent since the
materialization of ballot boxes could be discovered. Moreover,
the physical nature of the ballots limits the number of ballots
that could be added. Nonetheless, the examples highlight the
potential fraud associated with paper ballots.
Lever machines also are susceptible to several types of fraud.
Party workers could cast extra votes on the machines, and
technicians could tamper with the mechanical register behind
each lever or insert incorrect identifying strips on the front of the
machine. 40 Of significant concern, lever machines lack an audit
trail, which would make it difficult to trace any of these actions.
On the other hand, fraud on lever machines tends to be localized,
as each machine would need to be separately rigged. 41
Punch cards are subject to tampering by pre-punching the
card for the desired candidate, which would invalidate as an
"overvote" any selections of other candidates. Another possibility
is to manufacture the cards so that the desired candidate's chad
is easier to punch out or the undesired candidate's is harder to
dislodge. 42 Each of these methods of fraud is at least partly
detectible given the physical nature of the cards.
Like punch cards, optical scan ballots may contain additional
marks on the ballot for the favored candidate. Fraud can occur
when ballots are counted at the precinct level (because the readonly memory is subject to tampering) or at a central location
(where the transmission over phone lines and the central
tabulation are subject to manipulation). 4 3 As discussed below,
the greatest concern with optical scanners is presented by the
central tabulators that count all of the votes cast on machines
throughout various counties. 44
2. DREs
The completely paperless nature of DREs, along with the
role of computers in each stage of the vote counting process,
ensures that, of the five types of voting technologies, DRE fraud
(June 16, 1997), http://www.brasscheck.com/stadium/sum.html.
40 SALTMAN, supra note 22, § 3.3.2.
41 See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 35.
42 Id. at 35, 36.
43 SALTMAN, supra note 22, § 3.6.1.
44 See infra Part I.C.3.

2005]

VOTE COUNTING

45
is least likely to be detected and most likely to have vast effects.
In addition, DRE fraud is possible at each stage of the voting
before the election (through physically unsecured
process:
machines), during voting (through smartcards that allow voters
to gain unauthorized access), and after votes have been cast
(through votes that are misrecorded when registered or
tabulated).
A leading computer scientist explained that no one knows
how "to find all the errors in a computer system;. . . to make sure
that a system is secure or that it hasn't been corrupted;...
and ...to ensure that the systems in use are running the
46
These problems
software they are supposed to be running."
have not been solved even when technologists use "measures that
are far more sophisticated (and costly) than47 those used in the
design and certification of voting equipment."
Nor is the examination of computer software any more
transparent. Software is critical to DREs, with the success of
elections "hing[ing] on the correctness, robustness, and security
But flaws in software are not easily
of the software." 48
detectable, as malicious computer code may be disguised as
49 These dangers are
useful code or may be difficult to locate.
heightened in programs as complex as those used by DREs and
in software that the voting machine vendors have jealously
guarded as proprietary trade secrets.5 0
45 One commentator has explained that paperless DREs appear to reduce fraud
and error only by eliminating the ability to detect them and has analogized the
situation to "trying to solve your accounting problems by eliminating your
accounting department." Kim Alexander, The Need for Transparent, Accountable
1, Dec. 11, 2004, http://www.yubanet.com
and Verifiable U.S. Elections, YUBANET,
6 33
/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/10/1 1 .
46 David Dill, Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Rules and
at
available
2005),
21,
(June
Administration
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/Dill Statement.pdf.
47 Id.
48 KOHNO ET AL., supra note 32, at 3. My discussion of "software" in the text
refers to a collection of programs, commonly referred to as Election Management
Software (EMS), with functions that include controlling the ballot definition,
(voting), maintaining recordkeeping,
transactions
prompting user-interface
providing database security, and processing data.
49 ERIC A. FISCHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ELECTION REFORM
AND ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS (DRE'S): ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ISSUES 5 & n.l

(2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting/crsreport.pdf.

50 Id. at 13 (noting that DRE software is complex because it "serves as a voter
interface, records the ballot choices, and tallies the votes cast"); Editorial, Gambling

on Voting, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, § 4, at 12.
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For all of these reasons, the testing and certification process
is critical. Nonetheless, this process is flawed. For starters,
there is a "stunning lack of transparency" surrounding testing
and certification, which the companies complete in secret and
refuse even to discuss. 51 And for another, the "independent"
testing laboratories are chosen and paid by the vendors, with the
consequence that they are "under enormous pressure to do
reviews quickly, and not to find problems."5 2 As the president of
one of the companies conceded, "[t]here's going to be the risk of a
conflict of interest when you are being paid by the vendor that
you are qualifying [the] product for." 53
Even this lax certification is avoided when vendors install
uncertified software, often immediately before elections. Such
software was used, for example, by ES&S in three counties in
Indiana and by Diebold in each of the seventeen counties in
California in which it operated voting machines. 54 A more wellknown example occurred in Georgia in 2002. Shortly before the
election, Diebold installed multiple versions of uncertified
software in each of the state's 22,000 voting machines allegedly
to prevent the machines from freezing up. 55 This activity gained
added significance given the array of electoral surprises in the
56
election.
Another software vulnerability results from voting machines'
lax physical security. Machines have been left for days at polling
stations with pre-loaded ballots accessible to poll supervisors
hired without background checks while other machines have
51 Editorial, Who Tests Voting Machines?, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, § 4, at 8
(providing statement made by company spokesman: "[wle don't discuss our voting
machine work").
52 Id. For further doubt on the role played by certification, see infra
Parts
I.C.2.a-f (detailing numerous flaws with certified software).
53

Id.

Ian Hoffman, Electronic-Voting Critics Get Unusual Support From Labor,
OAKLAND TRIB. (Cal.), Jan. 15, 2004; Mary Beth Schneider, Election Panel OKs
54

Illegal Software, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 11, 2004, at B2; see also HARRIS, supra

note 32, at 189-90 (providing examples of counties in Arizona, California, Kansas,
Texas, and Washington).
55 HARRIS, supra note 32, at 90-94.
56 See id. at 88 (discussing 2002 electoral surprises in Georgia and also noting a
discovery on the Internet of a Diebold folder called "rob-georgia"). The upsets
included that of triple-amputee Vietnam veteran Senator Max Cleland (who was
leading in the pre-election polls but lost 531/-46%) and that of Governor Roy Barnes
(who was leading by 9 to 11 points but lost 51%-46%). Posting by Unregistered User
to http://www.votewatch.us/forums/general/497536620634 (Nov. 11, 2002, 1:27 PM).
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been secured by only a bicycle lock with a combination known by
poll supervisors and used at "every polling station in the
county."57 As a result, anyone with access to the machines could
example, the ballot definition or
alter software that controls, for
58
election.
the
of
the termination
Even when the software is certified and the machines are
secured, a disturbing number of vulnerabilities have been
Though not receiving much popular attention,
unearthed.
computer scientists have consistently and emphatically stressed
the ease with which fraud could occur. 59 In some cases, the
60 The
vendors themselves have conceded the potential for fraud.
remainder of this section details several vulnerabilities of DRE
software and provides examples from recent elections that are
consistent with these flaws. The discussion demonstrates that, of
all the voting technologies used today, DREs are subject to the
most far-reaching but least visible types of fraud.
a. Homebrew Smartcards
One way in which fraud could occur is through the use of
"homebrew smartcards. 61 When voters show up at the polling
57 Kim Zetter, Time to Recall E-Vote Machines?, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 6, 2003,
availableat http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,60713,00.html.
58 Id.
59 See generally COMPUWARE CORP., DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC (DRE)
at
available
(2003),
REPORT
ASSESSMENT
SECURITY
TECHNICAL
http://www.azfairelections.org/downloads/compuware.pdf [hereinafter COMPUWARE
REPORT] (reporting results from an extensive security assessment and validation of
DRE voting machines from four vendors); KOHNO ET AL., supra note 32 (presenting a
security analysis of electronic voting systems); SCI. APPLICATIONS INT'L CORP., RISK
ASSESSMENT REPORT: DIEBOLD ACCUVOTE-TS VOTING SYSTEM AND PROCESSES, at
iii (2003), available at http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbmpublishing/publiccontent/dbm-searchtechnology/toc-voting-system-report/votingsystemreportfina.p
df (identifying "several high-risk vulnerabilities," which, if exploited, could have a
"significant impact... on the accuracy, integrity, and availability of election
results"); MICHAEL A. WERTHEIMER, RABA INNOVATIVE SOLUTION CELL, TRUSTED
AGENT REPORT: DIEBOLD ACCUVOTE-TS VOTING SYSTEM 18-20 (2004), available at
(noting vote switching, the
http://www.raba.com/press/TAReportAccuVote.pdf
ability of a remote attacker "to get complete control of the machine," and the ability
to upload software that could "modify or delete elections") [hereinafter RABA
REPORT].
CHECKS AND BALANCES IN ELECTIONS
60 DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS,
EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES PREVENT ALLEGED FRAUD SCENARIOS 12 (2003),
available at http://www2.diebold.com/checksandbalances.pdf (conceding that "an
election insider" would be able to attack the "data stored internally on each voting
terminal"); see also infra notes 63 and 85 (detailing other Diebold concessions).
61 A smartcard is "a card, usually about the size of a credit card, with an
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site, they are given smart cards that they insert into the DRE
and that allows them to receive a ballot. 62 Computer scientists
found that attackers could create their own homebrew
smartcards, which could be obtained from vendors selling
programmable cards and which could be developed by
"attach[ing] a 'wiretap' device between the voting terminal
and a
legitimate smartcard and observ[ing] the communicated
messages."

63

This danger was highlighted by the Compuware Report, a
246-page report commissioned by the state of Ohio, that
examined the DREs of the four major vendors: Diebold, ES&S,
Hart, and Sequoia. The report found that the four-digit PIN code
for the smart card "is a factory default from Diebold [that] cannot
be changed... [and] was guessed in less than two minutes of
testing." 64 Voters who are able to program their own smartcards
have the ability to vote multiple times on a machine by
"ignor[ing] the voting terminal's deactivation command." 65
b. AdministratorSmartcards
Voters also could create their own "administrator cards,"
which would allow them to act as supervisors and take actions
such as terminating elections. 66 One potential "safeguard" that
Diebold could have employed to block this activity, a four-digit
PIN code, turned out to be meaningless because every supervisor
card used across the country has the same PIN: 1111.67 It is
therefore not surprising that the Compuware Report concluded
that "[t]here is a risk that an unauthorized person could learn
the PIN number. . . and gain access to the supervisor functions
on the machine," which would include the ability to "close the
68
polls early."
Nor is the vulnerability of the supervisor functions limited to
embedded computer chip that can communicate with another electronic device that
can read information from and/or write it to the card." FISCHER, supra note 49, at 14
n.48.
62 KOHNO ETAL., supra note 32, at 7.
63 Id. at 9. Diebold has conceded that "it would be possible to reverse engineer
the password" that would allow the use of one's own smartcard. DIEBOLD ELECTION
SYSTEMS, supra note 60, at 8.
64 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 52.
65 KOHNO ET AL., supra note 32, at 10.
66 Id. at 10-11.
67 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59,
68

Id.

at 57, 64, 72.
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659

Diebold. The supervisor password for the ES&S machines was
not encrypted even though anyone with access to a supervisor
card could vote multiple times, close an election early, or clear
Similarly, a "zero-length
the machine of all votes cast.69
password" on the Hart Intercivic machine could allow "an
unauthorized person ...[to] close the polls prematurely."70 And
even these systems seem secure in comparison to the Sequoia
an election by flipping
DRE, which allows any voter to terminate
71
machine.
the
of
back
a button on the
These vulnerabilities are not merely hypothetical. Recent
elections witnessed activity consistent with unauthorized access
to administrator smartcards, including (1) the 2000 elections in
Riverside County, California, in which a Sequoia DRE
"unaccountably froze, then began counting backward;" 72 (2) the
2002 elections in San Luis Obispo County, California, in which "a
machine spontaneously -began reporting totals with five hours
left in the election;" 73 and (3) the 2002 gubernatorial primary in
Florida, in which many votes in Miami County "were not
counted ...because machines were shut down improperly," with
the consequence that one precinct "with over 1,000 eligible voters
recorded no votes, despite a 33 percent turnout statewide. ' 74 To
be clear, these events have not been proven to be a direct result
of smartcard fraud. But they are in fact consistent with such
fraud and they reveal the unique dangers of DREs.
c. Ballot Definition
Another type of fraud would alter the data stored internally
in each DRE. One target could be the "ballot definition," which
provides details about the ballot such as precincts, races, and
candidates. 75 An attacker could change ballot definition files by
programming the software to count votes for one candidate as
votes for another candidate. Similarly, anyone working at a local
Internet Service Provider (ISP) could tamper with the

69 Id. at 96; see also id. at 100 (noting that, of the three necessary passwords,
"[t]wo... are hard-coded in the firmware and are only three characters in length").
70 Id. at 156, 177.
71 Id. at 204-05.
72 O'Donnell, supra note 33.

73 Id.
74 Editorial, Floridaas the Next Florida,N.Y. TIMES,
75 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 12.

Mar. 14, 2004, § 4, at 12.
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downloading of the ballot definition file from the Internet. 76
Despite the danger of access to the ballot definition, none of the
four major vendors have encrypted the data. 77
Errors consistent with altered ballot definition files have
occurred in numerous elections, including (1) the 2000
presidential election in New Mexico, in which 67,000 votes were
incorrectly counted because a worker used inaccurate party
affiliations; 78 (2) the 2002 election in Miami County, Florida, in
which a change in the order of candidates in the ballot definition
file resulted in an initial tally where the losing candidates
appeared to win; 79 (3) the September 2002 election in Union
County, Florida, in which 2,642 Democratic and Republican votes
were read as entirely Republican; 80 and (4) the 2004 presidential
election in Maryland, in which software "failed to record some
votes correctly, jumped to other pages on the ballot without being
prompted by the voter and inadvertently omitted some political
races." 8 1 Occurrences such as these are typically called "glitches"
or are blamed on human error.8 2 But whether due to error or
fraud, they underscore the heightened scale of potential
discrepancies resulting from the computerization of the vote
counting process.
d. Vote Records
Another type of data fraud targets the records of all cast
votes. Anyone with access to this data could alter vote records
and "generate or change as many votes as he or she pleased." 83
Such votes "would be indistinguishable from the true votes cast
KOHNO ET AL., supra note 32, at 13-14.
77 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 36, 95, 170, 203.
78 KOHNO ET AL., supra note 32, at 13 n.3; Donna Young, Human Error is Cause
of N.M. Election Glitch, GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, Nov. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.gcn.com/vol19_no33/news/3307-1.html.
79 Oscar Corral, Technician's Error,Not Machines, to Blame in Dade Election
Mix-Up, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 4, 2002, at 1A.
80 HARRIS, supra note 32, at 15.
76

81 William Welsh, Maryland E-Voting Controversy Continues in Presidential
Race,

WASHINGTON

TECH.,

Nov.

3,

2004,

available

at

http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/l-1/egov/24878-1.html.
82 See HARRIS, supra note 32, at 15 (discussing "programming errors"); Corral,
supra note 79 ("A software technician made a mistake... and the... ballots were
tallied based on the bad programming."); Welsh, supra note 81 (blaming human
error); Young, supra note 78 ("[A] county technical employee failed to set up an
element of the system properly.").
83

KOHNO ETAL., supra note 32, at 15-16.
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on the terminal."8 4 But despite the critical importance of the vote
records, one single Data Encryption Standard (DES) key,
F2654hD4, has encrypted all of Diebold's vote records data since
at least 1998.85 Not surprisingly, the testers in the Compuware
study were easily able to "alter[] counts" 8 6 on the Diebold DRE.
The vote records also were vulnerable on other machines, as
87
ES&S, Hart, and Sequoia each failed to encrypt the records.
The Compuware testers were able to "read and manipulate" vote
88
tallies on these systems as well.
Another danger, the multiple counting of votes, plagued
ES&S machines. As the Compuware Report noted: "Results can
be added multiple times due to a feature that gives an option to
89
either add or replace the votes when uploading the results."
This function can be repeatedly executed "with no warning,"
which would lead to over-counted votes. 90
This multiple counting on ES&S machines in fact occurred in
the 2004 elections. In Craven County, North Carolina, 11,283
votes were added to George Bush's total as the "precinct totals
[for nine of the county's twenty-six precincts] were added a
second time."91 In Lancaster County, Nebraska, the problem of
92
twice reading ballots "plagu[ed] almost all of the machines,"
and in Sarpy County, Nebraska, as many as 10,000 "votes were
93
counted twice."
In other cases, too few votes were recorded. Each of the
84

Id. at 16.

Id. at 14; DIEBOLD ELECTION SYSTEMS, supra note 59, at 15-16 (failing to
contest that encryption is limited to the single DES key). For the vulnerabilities of
the DES encryption standard, see DOUGLAS W. JONES, THE CASE OF THE DIEBOLD
FTP SITE § 6 (2003), http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-jones/voting/dieboldftp.html
(explaining that DES "was believed by many to be second-rate even at the time it
was introduced," and that the use of DES could result in the "cracking [of] the key
for one election ... allow[ing] an attack on the data for subsequent elections").
86 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 68.
87 Id. at 96, 170, 203.
88 Id. at 181.
89 Id. at 105.
90 Id. at 129.
91 Sue Book, Election Problems Due to a Software Glitch, NEW BERN SUN J.,
Nov. 5, 2004, available at http://www.newbernsj.com/SiteProcessor.cfm?Template=/
GlobalTemplatesfDetails.cfm&StoryID=18297&Section=Local.
92 Nate Jenkins, Problem Machines Spur Call for Recount, LINCOLN J. STAR,
NOV. 3, 2004, available at http://www.journalstar.conarticles/2004/11/03/top-story/
extras/doc4189b9c7f14bf764391458.txt.
93 Countinghouse Blues: Too Many Votes, WOWT NEWS, Nov. 5, 2004, available
at http://www.wowt.com/news/headlines/1161971.html.
85
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precincts in LaPorte County, Indiana counted only 300 votes (for
a total of 22,200) even though there were 79,000 voters in the
county. 94 In Carteret County, North Carolina, 4,400 votes were
lost, prompting a re-vote for the agriculture commissioner's
race. 95 And one precinct in Mahoning County, Ohio, recorded a
negative 25 million votes, while a machine in a precinct in
Mercer County counted only fifty-one votes for President even
96
though 289 ballots were cast on the machine.
e. Audit Logs
An audit log records all of the actions taken on a DRE, such
as "opening and closing the polls, voting, inserting invalid voting
cards, loss of power, and supervisor access. ' '97 Each of these
actions, recorded with a time-stamp, is compiled in a report "that
is a paper trail to guard against fraud. '98
Despite their
importance, the audit logs of each of the major vendors lack
encryption. 99 Not surprisingly, the Compuware testers were able
to change and delete the logs, 10 0 which would ensure that there
would be "no evidence that an attack was ever mounted."' 0 1
An incident consistent with the erasing of the audit logs
occurred in a September 2004 primary election in Snohomish
County, Washington.1 0 2 A mysterious three and one half hour
gap in the audit log appeared on the night of the election. Even
though there were summary reports generated at least five times

94 Kristin Miller, Computer Glitch Still Baffles County Clerk, THE NEWSDISPATCH,
Nov.
4,
2004,
available
at
http://www.wanttoknow.info/
041104newsdispatch.
95 Elections Board Calls for New Ag Election in Carteret,NBC17, Nov. 30, 2004,
available at http://www.nbcl7.com/politics/3957111/detail.html.
96 Harold Gwin, Democrats' Leader Decries Voting Glitches, VINDICATOR
SHARON BUREAU, Nov. 6, 2004, available at http://www.vindy.com/basic/news/

288078640794824.php; Untangling the Voting Controversies, PLAIN DEALER (Ohio),
Dec. 5, 2004, at A18. For one of many other potential examples, see Frank Zoretich,
Election Results Certified after Software Blamed, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Nov. 19,
2002, at A2 (noting that 48,000 early voters in November 2002 elections in Bernalillo
County, New Mexico, cast only 36,000 votes).
97 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 102.

Id. at 105.
99 Id. at 52, 96, 152, 203. Encryption signifies "the encoding... of
information ...so that it cannot be deciphered." FISCHER, supra note 49, at 13 n.39.
100 COMPUWARE REPORT, supranote 59, at 52, 68.
101 KOHNO ET AL., supra note 32, at 16.
102 To be clear, this example occurred on a central tabulator rather than an
individual DRE. See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.
98
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within the period, no entries appeared in the log between 9:52
103
p.m. and 1:31 a.m.

f. External Communications
The connection of DREs to unencrypted lines of
communication such as the Internet only increases the
vulnerabilities described above.
The Compuware Report
concluded that a DRE "could be compromised" if the network port
it provides for loading ballot definitions and downloading and
uploading vote records is "connected to an unsecured internet or
intranet."'10 4 Similarly, the mere tapping of a phone line could
have significant consequences. In particular, the intruder could
"intercept votes en route to the courthouse, change them with a
prewritten program, and send them on their way." 10 5 All of the
necessary information to execute this plan appears in the source
code that was posted on the Diebold Internet site. And none of
10 6
the four vendors encrypt data sent over communication links.
3. Central Tabulators
Significant flaws plague not only DREs but also the central
tabulators that count the votes from each of a county's precincts.
Votes cast on DREs and optical scanners are sent by modem to
the central tabulator, which counts the votes on Windows
software. Diebold's tabulators, called GEMS,' 0 7 have been used
in more than thirty states and can count as many as two million
votes. 08
Recent investigation showed that the GEMS central
tabulators are highly subject to vote manipulation. In particular,
an attacker could, within a few seconds, "entero a 2-digit code in

103 Bev Harris, Voting without Auditing (Nov. 3, 2004), http://www.apfn.net/
messageboard/1 1-04-04/discussion.cgi.26.html.
104

COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 78.

Zetter, supra note 57. A phone line could be tapped by "climb[ing] a
telephone poll or go[ing] down a manhole and put[ting] alligator clips on the wire."
Id.
106 COMPUWARE REPORT, supra note 59, at 58, 95, 152, 203.
107 "GEMS" stands for Global Election Management System. See Diebold
Election
Systems,
GEMS®
(Global
Election
Management
System),
http://www6.diebold.com/dieboldes/GEMS.htm (last visited July 23, 2005).
108 Bev Harris, Diebold GEMS Central Tabulator Contains Stunning Security
Hole, available at http://www.ejfi.orglVoting/Voting-30.htm (last visited July 23,
2005).
105
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a hidden location [and create] a second set of votes." 10 9 The
attacker then could generate countywide totals that bear no
relationship to the data reported from each of the precincts or
"melt down an election ...with two mouse clicks." 110
Although robust security techniques and limited access to
the tabulator could minimize the likelihood of these occurrences,
both conditions are absent with the Diebold system. The GEMS
tabulator uses a default password, GEMSUSER, that "has been
all over the Internet forever."11' 1 Numerous people have access to
the tabulator, including county employees, Diebold employees,
county
database technicians,
printshops,
and Diebold
contractors.1 1 2 And the database used by GEMS, Microsoft
11 3
Access, is well-known for its lack of security.
Nor would spot checks catch the vote switches: one of the
"books" of votes could display the actual votes while another-the
11 4
one used for the official count-could display the bogus votes.
In addition, as discussed above, the audit log can be altered to
erase any illegal activity.1 1 5 Even the officials who run the
election would have no idea that the vote totals had been
changed.116
109 Id.
110 Id. Of additional concern is the role played by Jeffrey Dean, who was hired
as Diebold Vice President of Research and Development shortly before the double set
of books was discovered in October 2000. Dean pled guilty to 23 counts of
embezzlement (including for the "sophisticated" manipulation of computer
accounting records) and presided over at least a dozen changes to GEMS before the
2000 election, with each change "retaining the new hidden vote tables." Id.

111 DIEBOLD
ELECTION SYSTEMS, REALITY VS.
ACCUSATIONS,
CORRECTING
MISINFORMATION
AND

FANTASY: ADDRESSING
INNUENDO 2
(2004),

http://www.diebold.com/dieboldes/response7.pdf.
112 Harris, supra note 108.
113 See, e.g., Access Solutions, Microsoft Access 2003 Security Innovations,
http://www.microsoft-accesssolutions.co.uk/ jet-sandbox-mode.htm (last visited July
23, 2005) (explaining that the database engine in Access "[t]raditionally ...has
offered security vulnerabilities"); Security: Gauging Your Security Needs;
Alternatives to Access/JET Security § 2, http://www.tek-tips.comfaqs.cfm?fid=3893
(warning "[i]f your data is very sensitive, do not use Access as your means of
security").
114 Harris, supra note 108.
115 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
116 Harris, supra note 108 ("The [Microsoft] Access database, which contains the
hidden set of votes, can't be seen unless you know how to get in the back door."); JIM
MARCH, DIEBOLD'S VOTE-TALLY SOFrWARE (2003), http://www.equalccw.com/
dieboldtestnotes.html (noting that the countywide totals are pulled from one data
file and the precinct-by-precinct data come from another, and that "GEMS never
checks to see if the two match, or informs the GEMS console user that this is
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Employee communications confirm many of these risks. One
Diebold employee corroborated that he could open data files,
"includ[ing] the audit log," and "alter [their] contents." 117 He
further noted that the security hole has been open "for at least a
decade" and that he has not put a password on the files because
the ability
to end-run the database has admittedly got[ten] people out of a
bind .... Jane... did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file
[e.g., hacked the election tallying database] in Gaston [County,
North Carolina] recently. I know our dealers do it. King
for it. That's why we've never
County[, Washington] is famous 118
put a password on the file before.
The Compuware Report concluded that anyone "with access
to the GEMS server" could change election results.1 9 It therefore
is concerning that a Diebold field tech agent confirmed that he
could access the central computer using an ordinary laptop and
indicated that the GEMS tabulator was accessible through the
Internet. 120 Nor does it inspire confidence that the phone
numbers allowing optical scan machines to contact the GEMS
12
tabulators are "known to ... the Diebold support staff."'
In short, tampering with the central tabulator that counts
millions of votes is astonishingly easy. 122 It could be done
quickly, with no trace of the activity, 23 and with the involvement
happening").
117

E-mail from Ken Clark to Support (Oct. 18, 2001, 9:55:02 MST), reprinted in

Alastair Thompson, Diebold Internal Mail Confirms U.S. Vote Count Vulnerabilities,
SCOOP INDEP. NEWS (N.Z.), Sept. 12, 2003, at app., http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/

stories/HL0309/S00106.htm.
118

Id.

REPORT, supra note 59, at 64; see also RABA REPORT, supra
note 65, at 20 (noting that the only requirement for "full system administrator
privileges" is "a valid phone number for the GEMS server").
120 E-mail from Robert Chen to Support (Oct. 28, 2002, 1:30 PM), copied in its
entirety in MARCH, supra note 116.
121 MARCH, supra note 116.
122 For an example of access to the central tabulator, see Bev Harris, Money,
Access, and Stunning Security Flaws-A Poor Recipe for Fair Elections, SCOOP
INDEP. NEWS (N.Z.), Apr. 2, 2004, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0404/
S00024.htm (indicating that in a 2004 county supervisor election in Riverside
County, California, one candidate received progressively more votes-allowing him
narrowly to surpass 50 percent and avoid a runoff election-after Sequoia employees
began accessing the central tabulator).
123 The inability to trace the activity is, in part, a consequence of the nature of
digital media. See Harris, supra note 108 (documenting ability to alter audit logs
"without leaving a trace").
119 COMPUWARE
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of only a few. 124 The types of fraud possible on DREs and central
tabulators thus present significant threats to the accurate
counting of the vote.
D. PartisanAffiliations
These vulnerabilities take on added concern in light of the
ties that most of the major voting machine vendors have with the
Republican Party. The chief executive of Diebold, for example,
has been an active Republican fundraiser who famously promised
"to help 'Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the President."' 125
ES&S was initially funded by Howard Ahmanson, a member of
the right-wing Council for National Policy and the Christian
Reconstructionist movement, and is partly owned today by
Republican Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska. 126 The parent
company of Sequoia is a partner of the Carlyle Group, which has
employed former President George H.W. Bush as senior
advisor.127 And a significant investor in Hart Intercivic is Tom
Hicks, who bought the Texas Rangers from President George W.

Bush in

1999.128

124 MARCH, supra note 116 (noting that as few as five or (more likely) seven or
eight people would need to be involved: "[t]wo or three programmers, one or two
managers who are politically savvy and know which races to hack, one guy back in
the 'build room' setting GEMS boxes up, and one guy able to collect the data from
the field regarding phone numbers [and] passwords").
125 Jay Miller, Spurring FinancialSupport, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND BUS., Sept. 13,
2004, at 1.
126 Sabrina Eaton, High-tech Voting Machines Could be Rigged, Experts Say,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 7, 2003, at A10; 2004 U.S. Presidential Election
Controversy, Voting Machines, http://www.biography.ms/2004U.S.presidential_
election controversy,_votingmachines.html
(last visited July 23, 2005). The
Christian Reconstructionist movement advocates the death penalty for adultery and
homosexuality. Editorial, Public Pulse, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 10, 2001, at
6b.
127 Carlyle Group, Williams Energy Partners Announces New Owner of its
General Partnerand of a Majority of its Limited PartnerInterests, June 17, 2003,
http://www.thecarlylegroup.com/eng/fund/15fundnews-2590.html; Jefferson Smurfit
Group Company History, http://www.smurfit-group.com/popTimeline/2000.htm (last
visited July 23, 2005); Independent Media TV, Bush Senior Retires from Carlyle
Post,
Oct.
21,
2003,
http://www.independent-media.tv/item.cfm?fmedia_
id=3320&fcategory desc=Carlyle%2OGroup.
128 HARRIS, supra note 32, at 79. A survey of campaign contributions found that
several of the companies gave to both the Republican and Democratic parties. The
Business of Elections, ELECTION REFORM BRIEFING (Electionline.org, Wash. D.C.),
Aug. 2004, at 5, http://www.electionline.orglPortals/l/Publications/The Business of
Elections.pdf. Other than Diebold's contributions to the Republican party, however,
the amounts were de minimis, thus not overcoming the links noted in the text. Id. at
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It also is concerning that the concentration of vendors is
significantly higher today than it has historically been. Two
companies, Diebold & ES&S, have counted approximately eighty
percent of the votes cast in U.S. elections in recent years. 129 By
reducing the number of systems that need to be compromised,
such developments make it easier to commit widespread
tampering. 130
The dangers of such concentration and party affiliation are
exacerbated by the lack of transparency in vote counting today.
The voting machine vendors refuse to allow inspection of the
software used to count the vote, and the computerization of the
process means that local election officials can no longer uncover
fraud by examining the machines. As a result, the officials rely
more heavily on, and often develop close relationships with, the
These relationships may play a role in the
vendors. 13 1
enthusiasm for electronic voting displayed by Democratic and
Republican officials alike. 132 A final concern in the vote counting
3 (noting that from 2001 to early 2004, Diebold contributed $409,170 to Republicans
and $2,500 to Democrats; ES&S gave $21,900 to Republicans and $24,550 to
Democrats; Sequoia Voting Systems gave $3,500 to Republicans and $18,500 to
Democrats; and Hart InterCivic gave $3,250 to Republicans and $2,500 to
Democrats).
129 2004 U.S. Presidential Election Controversy, supra note 126.
130 FISCHER, supra note 2, at 13.
KEEPING ELECTRONIC
131 DOUGLAS W. JONES,
http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-jones/voting/aaas2005.shtml.

VOTING

HONEST

(2005),

132 David Cho, Fairfax Judge Orders Logs of Voting Machines Inspected, WASH.
POST, Nov. 6, 2003, at B01 (indicating that the Democratic Fairfax County (Virginia)
election supervisor Margaret Luca stated that electronic voting machines "get an Aplus" even though a narrowly defeated school board candidate lost one out of every
100 votes and the county Republican committee issued a critical report that
concluded that "[t]he Fairfax experience was a bitter disappointment-at best"

(referencing

FAIRFAX

COUNTY REPUBLICAN

COMMITTEE,

OPERATION

BALLOT

(2004),
available at http://www.fairfaxco-gop.org/download/
INTEGRITY 2
ballot.integrity.pdf)); Lou Dobbs Tonight: Bush and Kerry Trade Jabs (CNN
television broadcast Mar. 8, 2004), transcriptavailableat http://transcripts.cnn.coml
TRANSCRIPTS/0403/08/ ldt.00.html (documenting that Republican Florida
Secretary of State Glenda Hood stated that she has "had no problem whatsoever"
with electronic voting); see also Jason Miller, E-Voting Debate: Paper or No Paper,
GOV'T COMPUTER NEWS, June 7, 2004, available at http://appserv.gcn.coml23-13/
statelocal/26086-1.html (noting Democratic Maryland Election Administrator Linda
Lamone's statement that "[w]e have used electronic voting equipment for 30
elections, and we haven't had a single problem with the equipment"); Dave Williams,
Cox Gets Ready for 2006, GWINNETT DAILY POST (Ga.), Apr. 17, 2005, available at
(noting that Democratic Georgia
http://www.cathycox.com/news/4-17-05.htm
Secretary of State Cathy Cox was instrumental in introducing statewide electronic
voting in 2002). Another reason for officials' enthusiasm likely is their reduced
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process involves the partisan connections of many election
133
officials themselves.
II. 2004 ELECTION
Evidence from the 2004 election is consistent with the errors
and fraud discussed in Part I. This section first examines
inaccuracies from the election and then presents circumstantial
evidence that has been marshaled in evaluating the accuracy of
the results.
A. Inaccuracies

With the exception of paper ballots, each of the voting
technologies used in the 2004 election suffered from an array of
errors.1 34
Several voters using punch cards had difficulty
punching holes, saw pre-punched holes, and suffered from
miscounted votes. 135 On many lever machines, the levers were
responsibilities in administering a paperless system.
133 For example, state election officials often serve as chairs of their political
party's election campaigns. Letter from Kenneth Blackwell, available at
http://rawstory.rawprint.com/105/blackwell-campaign-letter2_105.php (last visited
July 23, 2005) (documenting that Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell
thanked supporters for "helping deliver" Ohio and announcing that he was "truly
pleased" to announce Bush's victory in the state).
Nor are the concerns limited to state election officials. Congressman Peter King
(R-N.Y.) justified his statement in the middle of Election Day 2004 that "the
election's over [and w]e won" by explaining: "It's all over but the counting and we'll
take care of the counting." Posting of Free Press Int'l to eBlogger, Video clip: And
We'll Take
Care of the
Counting, http://www.freepressinternational.com/
pete.299880.ny. 129501.html (Dec. 5, 2004).
134 Thanks to the creation of an "Election Incident Reporting System" by
Verified Voting Foundation and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility,
voting problems were instantaneously tracked from across the nation. These records
are now memorialized in a database of more than 40,000 election incidents,
including more than 2,200 associated with voting machines. DAVID DILL & WILL
DOHERTY,
ELECTRONIC
VOTING
SYSTEMS
(2004),
available
at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/cstb/project-evotingvvf.pdf.
135 See, e.g., Election Incident Reporting Number [hereinafter EIRN] 33495,
54500 (reflecting difficulty punching hole for Kerry), 60406 (reflecting difficulty
punching hole for Kerry); 35414 (pre-punched holes for Bush), 48820 (pre-punched
holes for Bush), https:H/voteprotect.org/index.php? display=EIRMapNation (follow
"Download Incidents" hyperlink to view incidents) (lastvisited July 23, 2005); see
also Dan Harrie & Mark Eddington, 33,000 Ballots Lost in Shuffle, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Nov. 13, 2004, at Al (noting that 33,000 straight-party ballots of the roughly 150,000
ballots cast in a Utah county were not included in the initial tally); Robert Morgan,
Waiting in Wichita, TIMES RECORD NEWS (Tex.), Nov. 4, 2004, available at
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3690 (revealing that a software "glitch"
was responsible for more than 25% of the first 26,000 ballots tabulated in a Texas
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137
And optical scan machines malfunctioned,
broken. 136
incorrectly tabulated voters' choices, 138 and even subtracted votes
1 39
for John Kerry in one state.
But the most frequent and most severe errors were
lacked the ability to
associated with DREs. The machines, which
140 broke down,1 4 1 lost
state,
every
nearly
conduct recounts in
votes, added votes, switched votes, and suffered other problems
during the 2004 election. To cite only a few examples:
. Machines in Broward County, Florida began counting
1 42
backwards when they reached 32,767 votes.
. A DRE in Carteret County, North Carolina lost more
than 4,500 votes when 7,537 votes were cast but the

county not recording a vote for President).
136 EIRN, supra note 135, 33002, 40706, 51331 (NY and PA counties with

broken Kerry levers); see also id. at 31440, 37924, 39712 (PA counties in which
levers for other Democratic candidates broken).
137 EIRN, supra note 135, 1087, 1118, 17647, 28659, 29326, 29404, 29577,
30200, 30673, 30709, 30710, 30718, 31402, 31406, 31930, 31939, 32042, 32096,
32451, 33143, 33164, 33641, 34478, 35985, 38687, 37106, 40367, 40674, 41187,
41339, 42451, 43540, 44797, 49025, 52056, 53974, 54456, 55204, 56181 (providing
examples from AL, AZ, CA, CO, DC, FL, IL, KS, MA, MI, NC, OH, SC, TX, and VA).
138 For example, optical scan machines in Indiana counted straight-party
Democratic tickets for Libertarian candidates. See Pam Tharp, Elections, PALADIUMITEM (Ind.), Nov. 23, 2004, at 12A.
139 Even though John Kerry led after seventy percent of the vote had been
counted in fifty-seven of Oklahoma's seventy-seven counties, he wound up losing
every county in the state, with his vote totals in some counties less than they had
been at the seventy percent mark. Bob Nichols, Update: Voting Machines Count

Backward

in

Okla.,

OKLA.

INDEP.

MEDIA

CENTER,

Nov.

27,

2004,

http://okimc.org/newswire.php?storyid=344 (noting that, in the final thirty percent
of the count, Kerry lost 37,982 votes while Bush gained 393,825 votes); see also Kelly
Kurt, Voters Look to Moral Issues, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 3, 2004, at A10; CNN.com
Election Results (July 22, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/
results/states/OK/P/00/county.000.html.
140 Only Nevada used DRE machines that were attached to printers. Press
Release, Nev. Sec'y of State, Secretary of State Heller Announces Direct Recording
Electronic Voting Machine Choice (Dec. 10, 2003), http://secretaryofstate.biz/
press/121003.htm.
141 See, e.g., DILL & DOHERTY, supra note 134, at 3 (citing forty-two reports of
total breakdowns in New Orleans); Report Shows Problems with Montgomery Voting
Machines, WTOP NEWS, Mar. 31, 2005, available at http://www.wtopnews.com/
index.php?sid=440855& nid=25&template (noting that fifty-eight DREs in Maryland
failed to boot up); EIRN, supra note 135, 41693, 55533 (reporting breakdowns in
Maryland and Florida).
142 John Murawski, Broward Vote-Count Glitch a Cinch for Cyber Solvers, PALM
BEACH POST, Nov. 14, 2004, at 1C (noting that the flaw plagued two elections in
Broward County and one in Guilford County, North Carolina).
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machine was set at a capacity of 3,005 votes. 143
. A precinct in Mahoning County, Ohio recorded a
negative 25 million votes. 144
. George Bush received 4,258 votes in a precinct in
Franklin County, Ohio in which only 638 voters cast
45
ballots.1
. More than 11,000 votes were added to Bush's total in
Craven County, North Carolina as votes for at least 9 of
the county's precincts "were added a second time." 146
- There were numerous instances of votes being switched
from one candidate to another. To pick just a few typical
examples:
. A voter in Broward County, Florida asserted: "At
[the] review screen, [my] selection changed from Kerry
' 147
to Bush 'before my eyes."
. A voter in Pinellas County, Florida stated that
"touch screen voting machin[es] are defaulting to
Bush/Cheney" and that even though voters have "tried
to change [their vote] to Kerry, [it] kept going back to
148
Bush."

- A voter in Palm Beach County, Florida "[t]ried 9-10
times" to cast a vote, each time deleting the machine's
selection of Bush.149
Of particular concern, nearly all of the vote switches were in
one direction. My exhaustive search of the election incident
database-which included every incident in which a voter called
the hotline and mentioned the term "Kerry," "Bush," "Democrat,"
or "Republican"-uncovered ninety-nine incidents of vote
switching. Of these, voters reported seventy-nine incidents of
switches from Kerry to Bush, with many mentioning multiple
occurrences, 5 0 and nineteen occasions of switches from Kerry to
143 Jannette Pippin, Early Votes in CarteretCounty, N.C., Are Permanently Lost,
Machine Maker Says, DAILY NEWS (N.C.), Nov. 9, 2004.
144 Untangling the Voting Controversies,supra note 96.
145 John McCarthy, Voting Machine Errorin Ohio Gave Bush 3,893 Extra Votes,

GUELPH MERCURY (Ohio), Nov. 6, 2004, at A10.
146 Book, supra note 91. ES&S machines in particular. suffered problems with

overvoting, as discussed above. See, e.g., Three Council of State Races Remain
Undecided, WRAL.COM,
Nov.
4,
2004, http://www.wral.com/news/3891488/

detail.html (discussing twice-counted ballots in other counties in North Carolina).
147 EIRN, supra note 135, 55055.
148 EIRN, supra note 135, 33258.

149 EIRN, supra note 135, 39396.

150 EIRN, supra note 135, 48010 (Cal.); 13490, 16735, 17826, 18569, 18688,
22524, 24179, 31377, 33258, 38533, 38775, 39328, 39396, 39531, 39721, 41745,
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a third party candidate. 151 Only one voter reported a DRE
switching a Bush vote to Kerry. 152 It also is concerning that more
than one-half of all reported switches occurred in the "swing"
15 3
state of Florida.
Of course, a total of ninety-nine incidents does not provide a
sample size to which we can attribute statistical significance, and
it is at least conceivable that Kerry voters were more likely to
report problems in voting. On the other hand, in thousands of
precincts, Democratic and Republican voters alike had access to
the election hotline phone number. And it is possible that the
reported incidents are only the tip of the iceberg given that many
voters would tend not to report problems after voting and that
switches or machines that
many incidents revealed multiple
154
day."
all
that
doing
"ha[d] been
Consistent with machines repeatedly making the same error
is the pattern of vote switches in various states. Of the fiftythree reported switches in Florida, forty-three were from Kerry
to Bush (with nine from Kerry to other candidates). Of the
42578, 43451, 44658, 46528, 47099, 48269, 52639, 53430, 55055, 55066, 55396,
55458, 55485, 55842, 55860, 55978, 58116, 58213, 58328, 58329, 60432, 60756,
61244, 62068, 63812, 63816, 63846 (Fla.); 17705, 36180, 37481, 37666, 49209, 62363
(Ga.); 35481 (Kan.); 35862, 43115, 46968, 47289, 47376, 52582, 62045, 63948 (Ohio);
14216, 14754, 15252, 15336, 18033, 18957, 19315, 21981, 26586, 28858, 29306,
37893, 46164, 47873, 59747 (Tex.); 13536, 43610 (Va.); 39275, 41871, 47757 (Wash.).
151 EIRN, supra note 135, 39163 (Cal.); 41979, 42530, 46394, 46762, 47606,
55080, 55477, 56831, 63818 (Fla.); 33853, 35228, 35436, 42006, 45322, 59157, 59224
(N.M.); 46835 (Ohio); 40147 (S.C.).
152 EIRN, supra note 135, 48034 (Fla.).
153 See supra notes 150-52 (showing that fifty-three incidents of vote-switching
were in Florida). Even enlarging the scope of the study beyond vote switches

between the presidential candidates reveals a bias towards Bush. There were fifteen
reported incidents of general switches between the parties, with thirteen of these
incidents favoring Republicans. EIRN, supra note 135, 15928, 17640, 31509, 33406,
41725, 43999, 46179, 47278, 47570, 47683, 49986, 53724, 60384 (favoring
Republicans); EIRN, supra note 135, 46108, 55744 (favoring Democrats). There were
twenty-two incidents in which it was either difficult to vote for Bush or Kerry or one
of the choices was pre-selected. Of these incidents, twenty aided Bush. EIRN, supra
note 135, 14203, 21614, 25706, 29441, 29974, 31061, 31931, 32344, 36177, 38151,
40346, 47630, 52219, 52341, 55454, 55637, 58013, 58748, 60876, 63847 (favoring
Bush); EIRN, supra note 135, 43856, 59351 (favoring Kerry). And there were nine
reported instances in which DREs defaulted to or otherwise favored a party, with six
of the occurrences helping Republicans. EIRN, supra note 135, 31359, 34506, 48422,
48801, 59658, 62360 (favoring Republicans); EIRN, supra note 135, 33761, 53619,
59246 (favoring Democrats).
154 EIRN, supra note 135, 47099 (Fla.). See, e.g., EIRN, supra note 135, 63846
(reporting that one volunteer received seventy-five calls complaining that votes for
Kerry were switched to Bush).
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fifteen reported switches in Texas, thirteen were from a straightDemocratic ticket to Bush, and all seven of the switches in New
Mexico were from Kerry to a third-party candidate. 155 In short,
the overwhelming asymmetry in the direction of vote switches
raises significant questions about the operation of DREs.
B. CircumstantialEvidence
The inaccuracies unearthed in the 2004 presidential election
gain added significance in light of the magnitude of potential
fraud, as attackers have the capability of altering thousands, if
not millions, of votes on DREs and central tabulators. Moreover,
because of the hidden nature of computerized counting, the ease
of altering vote counts and audit logs, and the inability to
conduct DRE recounts, the ability to uncover error or fraud is
lower than it has ever been. Circumstantial evidence thus is of
unique importance in corroborating the accuracy of the vote
count. This section explores exit polls, pre-election polls, and
activity in Ohio that raises questions and serves as an
independent check-typically the only one-on the vote count.
1. Exit Polls
Of all the anomalies of the 2004 presidential election, exit
polls have received perhaps the most attention. As they sample
actual voters, do not confront difficulties such as contacting cellphone users, and are continually being adjusted, exit polls have
generally been considered to be the most reliable type of polls. 156
Since their invention several decades ago, exit polls have
successfully predicted the outcome of thousands of races. 157
It therefore is not surprising that the Bush administration
155 For documentation of the switches in Florida, Texas, and New Mexico, see

supra notes 146-52.

156 H. JUDICIARY COMM. DEMOCRATIC STAFF, PRESERVING DEMOCRACY: WHAT

WENT

WRONG IN OHIO
76 (2005),
available at http://www.house.gov/
judiciary-democrats/ohiostatusreptl505.pdf [hereinafter PRESERVING DEMOCRACY];
see also JONATHAN D. SIMON & RON P. BAIMAN, THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:
WHO WON THE POPULAR VOTE? 4 (2004), available at http://www.freepress.org/
images/departments/PopularVotePaperl8l_1.pdf (asserting that because exit polls
had performed accurately in thousands of races, voters began to see them as
flawless).
157 SIMON & BAIMAN, supra note 156, at 4; see generally Warren J. Mitofsky, A
Short History of Exit Polls, in POLLING AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION COVERAGE 83-

99 (Paul J. Lavrakas & Jack K. Holley eds., 1991) (giving a background on exit
polling).
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helped to pay for exit polls during recent elections in the former
1 58
A
Soviet republics of Belarus, Georgia, and the Ukraine.
deputy assistant secretary of state explained that exit polls
constituted one of the "ways that would help to expose large-scale
fraud" and "pointed to the discrepancy between exit polls and the
official vote count to argue that the ... Ukraine election was
stolen." 159
In particular, the exit polls used in the 2004 U.S. elections
involved 73,000 interviews for state polls and 13,000 for a
national poll, a sample "approximately six times larger than the
60
sample normally used in high quality pre-election [] polls."'
Running the operation was Warren Mitofsky, who is considered a
pioneer in exit polling.161
It therefore is concerning that the election was marked by a
greater disparity between exit polls and the official vote count
than has occurred in at least the past twenty years. The national
exit poll posted on the CNN.com website on November 3 at 12:23
A.M. is the most independent and accurate of all the exit polls; in
contrast to the polls released throughout Election Day, it
includes interviews from the entire day, and, because subsequent
polls are "adjusted" to mirror the official vote count, it is the most
recent poll available that can serve as an independent check on
the vote count.' 62 The poll indicated that John Kerry received
51% of the vote and George Bush received 48%.163 In contrast,
158

Steve Freeman & Josh Mitteldorf, A Corrupted Election: Despite What You

Feb. 15, 2005,
May Have Heard, the Exit Polls Were Right, IN THESE TIMES,
97
availableat http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1 0.

159 Id. (chronicling speech of John Tefft, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian affairs).
160 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supranote 156, at 72-73.
161 See id. at 72 (stating that Mitofsky "largely created"

the modern exit polling
Information,
Company
International,
Mitofsky
also
see
method);
http://www.mitofskyinternational.concompany.htm (last visited July 25, 2005)
(stating that 'Ivitofsky has directed exit polls and quick counts since 1967 for almost
3,000 electoral contests").
162 CNN.com, U.S. President/Nat'l/Exit Poll, http://www.exitpollz.org/exitpolls/
nat/natl223CNNScreenOO03pgl.jpg (last visited July 23, 2005); see also RON
BAIMAN ET AL., US COUNT VOTES' NATIONAL ELECTION DATA ARCHIVE PROJECT,
ANALYSIS OF THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION EXIT POLL DISCREPANCIES 19-21

(2005), available at http://electionarchive.org/ucvAnalysisUS/ExitPolls_2004_
dison-Mitofsky.pdf [hereinafter US COUNT VOTES] (providing an explanation of exit
poll adjusting).
163 The pollsters confirmed these numbers in their report on the election.
EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH & MITOFSKY INT'L, EVALUATION OF EDISON/MITOFSKY

ELECTION SYSTEM 2004, at 20 (2005), available at http://www.exit-poll.net/election-
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the actual vote count favored Bush, 50.9% to 48.1%, resulting in
a 5.8% discrepancy with the exit polls. 164 Statisticians have
agreed that such a disparity cannot be attributed to chance.1 65
This trend also occurred in the "battleground states," as ten of
the eleven states witnessed an official margin for Bush that
exceeded-often by a significant amount-the predicted
margin.166
The exit pollsters, Edison and Mitofsky, have conceded that
"the precinct samples did not contribute to the error of the exit
poll estimates." 167 They also conceded that the primary source of
the error is "within precinct error" (WPE), or the difference
between the official and exit poll results in sampled precincts. 168
This figure, which the pollsters calculate at 6.5%, "is the largest
WPE that [they] have observed on a national level in the last five
presidential elections."'169
In addition, in contrast to the 1996 and 2000 elections, in
which the errors were "more random," the errors in the 2004
election were "much more in one direction."'170 The discrepancy

night/EvaluationJanl92005.pdf ("The weighted national survey numbers showed
Kerry with 51% and Bush with 48%."); National Election Pool: United States
General Exit Poll, http://www.exitpollz.org/mitof4zone/
2004G_3798_PRES04_
ONE H Data.pdf (last visited July 23, 2005) (same).
164 KABC-TV
Los Angeles, Vote
2004:
Complete
Election
Results,
http://abclocal.go.com/kabc/news/elections2004 (last visited July 23, 2005). The exact
discrepancy may vary slightly due to the lack of a significant digit in the "percent"
column on the webpage.
165US COUNT VOTES, supra note 162, at 3 & n.3 (noting that statisticians have
estimated the probability of such a disparity being attributed to chance at 1 in 1,240
to 1 in 16 million).
166 STEVEN F. FREEMAN, THE UNEXPLAINED EXIT POLL DISCREPANCY 2 tbl.1.1
(2004), available at http://center.grad.upenn.edulcenter/get.cgi?item=exitpollp. The
battleground states-which were listed "on at least two of three prominent lists:
Zogby, MSNBC, and Washington Post"-are Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin. Id. at 2 & n.5. In the critical states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida,
for example, the vote count differed from the exit polls by 2.1% to 6%, in each case
favoring
Bush.
See
NEP
Declared
Errors
Excel
Spreadsheet,
http://www.exitpollz.org/tables/NEPdeclaredErrors.xls (last visited July 23, 2005)
(indicating that in Ohio, Kerry garnered 53.2% in the exit polls, but received 48.7%
of the vote; in Florida, he polled 49.2% but received 47.1%; and in Pennsylvania, he
polled 56.9% but received 50.9%).
167 EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH & MITOFSKY INT'L, supra note 163, at 28.
168 Id.
at 31; see generally US COUNT VOTES, supra note 162, at 6 (defining
WPE).
169 EDISON MEDIA RESEARCH & MITOFSKY INT'L, supra note 163, at 31.
170

Id. at 34.
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occurred in almost all precincts, including heavily Republican
precincts (those in which Bush received at least eighty percent of
Finally, the
the vote), where the mean WPE was 10.0.171
to the
limited
was
pollsters conceded that the discrepancy
presidential election; the error rate in the 2004 Democratic
primaries, for example, was significantly lower at 1.9%.172
The primary hypothesis that has been proffered for the
discrepancy is that more Kerry voters than Bush voters
participated in the exit polls. The contention is that Democratic
voters were more willing to talk to pollsters than were
Republican voters. 173 While such a scenario is not impossible,
Edison and Mitofsky did not offer any evidence to support their
hypothesis. In fact, to the extent their report offers any evidence
on this point, it appears to be more consistent with the opposite
conclusion: More voters in highly Republican precincts (56%)
responded to the exit poll interviews than did voters in highly
Democratic precincts (53%).174
In short, the largest and most one-sided discrepancy between
exit polls and vote tallies in the modern era cannot be attributed
to sampling error or to any other documented flaw. The most
likely explanation, then, is that the vote count itself was
incorrect.
2. Incumbent Performance in Pre-election Polls
In the past fifty years, the pre-election polls have been an
"extraordinarily accurate predictor" in forecasting the percentage
of the vote that the incumbent president would receive on
Election Day. 175 For example, of the four incumbent presidential
elections in the past quarter century (with examples from prior
years detailed in the margin), 176 the incumbent exceeded his final
Id. at 36.
at 26.
173 Id. at 4.
174 Id. at 37; US COUNT VOTES, supra note 162, at 9. For a mathematical
argument that the pollsters' report is not necessarily inconsistent with "reluctant
171

172 Id.

Bush responders," see ELIZABETH LIDDLE, EDISON/MITOFSKY EXIT POLLS 2004:
DIFFERENTIAL NON-RESPONSE OR VOTE-COUNT CORRUPTION? (2005), available at

http://www.mysterypollster.com/main/filesIWPEpaper.pdf.
175 Guy Molyneux,

The Big Five-Oh, AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, Oct. 1, 2004,
69

http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=8
4.
Record, http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/
176 See Gallup Poll Accuracy
?ci=1258 (last visited July 23, 2005) (showing that in 1956, the final Gallup pre-
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poll number only once (and then, by only one point). In 1980,
Jimmy Carter received 42% in the final polls and 41% of the
actual vote; in 1984, Ronald Reagan exceeded his performance in
the final polls by 1% (59% to 58%); in 1992, George Bush's vote
totals matched his final polls at 37%; and in 1996, Bill Clinton
received 51% in the final polls but only 49% of the vote. 177
"On average," one recent survey concluded, "the incumbent
comes in half a point below his final poll result." 178 In contrast,
the challenger "exceed[s] their final poll result by at least 2
points, and the average gain is 4 points."1 79 Another recent
analysis demonstrated that in twenty-eight surveys of
presidential elections, the challenger received 86% of the latebreaking undecided vote.18 0 The reason is clear: Undecided
voters often do not believe that the incumbent deserves to be reelected but are not familiar enough with the challenger to
publicly state their preference in pre-election polls.' 8 '
The 2004 elections diverge from this pattern more than any
other election in the past half-century. The average of the preelection polls pegged George Bush at 48.9% and John Kerry at
47.4%.182 Although the exit polls, which favored Kerry 51-48%,
are consistent with the historical trend of Bush receiving no more
than 49%, the vote tallies, which Bush won, 51-48%, are not.18 3
Thus, for the first time in more than a half-century, the
incumbent president significantly exceeded his final pre-election
poll numbers. This result is even more surprising given the high
turnout in the election, a factor that has historically benefited

election poll for Dwight Eisenhower exceeded his actual vote total, 59.5% to 57.8%;
in 1964, Lyndon Johnson's final poll of 64% exceeded his actual total of 61.3%; in

1972, the poll for Richard Nixon exceeded his vote total, 62% to 61.8%; and in 1976,
Gerald Ford's poll of 49% exceeded his actual vote total of 48.1%).
177 Molyneux, supra note 175. These pre-election poll numbers represent "an
average of the final surveys conducted by the three major networks and their
partners." Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. (emphasis omitted).
1so Posting of Chris Bowers to MyDD.com, Incumbent Rule Research Update,
http://www.mydd.com/story/2004/9/3/22294/96534 (Sept. 3, 2004, 22:29:04 EDT).
iSi

Molyneux, supra note 175.

See RealClearPolitics Poll Averages, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/
polls.html (last visited July 23, 2005) (summing results of Marist, GW/Battleground,
TIPP, CBS News, Harris, FOX News, Reuters/Zogby, CNN/USA/Gallup, NBC/WSJ,
ABC/Washington Post, ARG, CBS/NY Times, Pew Research, and Newsweek polls).
i83 See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
182
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Democrats.18 4
Curious patterns emerge on the state level as well. Although
there are many examples, I focus in this section on the events
transpiring in Ohio.1 85
3. Ohio: Phantom Votes, Undervotes, Unusual Turnouts, and
Preordained Recounts
In the aftermath of the 2004 election, many disturbing
details emerged about what occurred in Ohio, such as a shortage
of voting machines in Democratic areas, the restricted use of
provisional ballots, challenges to minority and urban voters,
misinformation, and intimidation.1 8 6 Although each of these
likely affected the vote count in some way, I focus in this section
on the discrepancies in which the voting machines played a direct
role: "phantom votes," undervotes, unusual turnout figures, and
preordained recounts. Most of the reported problems occurred on
punch card machines and DREs.
First, several precincts reported "phantom votes," or more
votes than voters. George Bush received 4,258 votes in a precinct
18 7
in Franklin County, Ohio in which only 638 voters cast ballots.
1 88
Two precincts in Perry County reported at least 124% turnout.
And in Trumbull County, there were 580 absentee votes that
89
could not be traced to voters.
Second, there were 93,000 undervotes in Ohio, with 75%
more of these occurring in Democratic than Republican
precincts.1 90 A machine in Mercer County counted only fifty-one
votes for President even though 289 ballots were cast on the
machine,1 9 1 and a machine in Youngstown County appeared to
184

FREEMAN, supra note 166, at 1 n.3.

For another example, see Warren Stewart, What Are They Hiding in New
Mexico?, SCOOP INDEP. NEWS (N.Z.), Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.scoop.co.nz
stories/HL0501/SO0152.htm (noting that more than 21,000 ballots-triple the
margin separating the candidates-did not record a vote for President and that
there were more than 2,000 "phantom votes" in which the number of votes exceeded
the number of ballots cast).
185

186 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 24-36, 40-47, 63-65.
187 McCarthy, supra note 145.
188 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 60.
189 Werner Lange, New Study: More Absentee Votes than Voters in Ohio, SCOOP

INDEP. NEWS
S00154.htm.

(N.Z.),

Dec.

12,

2004,

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0412/

190 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 70-71.
191 Harold Gw:n, Democrats' Leader Decries Voting Glitches, VINDICATOR, Nov.
6, 2004, available at http://www.vindy.com/basic/news/288078640794824.php.
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default to a blank screen when voters selected John Kerry, which
likely would explain a 14% undervote rate in a precinct in which
Kerry was receiving more than 90% of the vote. 192 Finally, a
machine in Mahoning County initially recorded a negative 25
193
million votes.
Third, voter turnout figures revealed unusual patterns
across the state. In Franklin County (which includes urban
Columbus), voter turnout figures were almost ten percent higher
in the precincts that Bush won than in those won by Kerry. 194 In
pro-Kerry Cleveland, where thousands of voters waited in line for
hours to vote, precincts registered turnouts as low as 7.85, 14.59,
20.07, 21.43, and 22.31%.195 And in ten counties, a little-known
and underfunded Democrat State Supreme Court candidate
received substantially more votes than the Kerry-Edwards
96
ticket.
Nor were the anomalies limited to these forms. Warren
County issued a "lockdown" and barred outsiders from observing
the counting of the vote in response to a terrorist threat that the
FBI denied issuing and that county officials had been planning
for almost a week. 97 In the final tally in the county, Kerry
received the exact same percentage (28%) that Al Gore had
received in 2000, even though he more vigorously contested the
vote and benefited from independent groups expending more
98
resources and Ralph Nader's not being on the ballot.
As another example, Miami County reported two sets of
returns: the first tally was approximately three-quarters of the
total from the 2000 election; the second witnessed a vote
percentage for Kerry that was, to the nearest one-hundredth of

192 Richard Hayes Phillips, Default Settings in Mahoning County, FREE PRESS,
Dec. 23, 2004, http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2004/1018.
193 Untangling the Voting Controversies,supra note 96.
194 Bob Fitrakis et al., Ten Preliminary Reasons Why the Bush Vote Does Not
Compute, and Why Congress Must Investigate Rather Than Certify the Electoral
College, FREE PRESS, Jan. 3, 2005, http://www.freepress.org/departments/
display/19/2004/1065.
195 Michael Keefer, The Strange Death of American Democracy: Endgame in
Ohio, GLOBAL RES., Jan. 24, 2005, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/
KEE501A.html (citing JAMES Q. JACOBS, 2004 OHIO ELECTION-ANALYSIS,

SUMMARY, CHARTS, AND SPREADSHEETS (2004), http://www.jcjacobs.netfbush/xls/

ohio.html).
196 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 54.
197 Id. at 49-50.

198 Id. at 50-51.
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one percent, exactly the same as it was in the first set of returns
(33.92%) and a margin of victory that was precisely 16,000
votes. 199 Precincts in the county reported turnouts as high as
94.27 and 98.55%.200
Finally, third parties received an
abnormally high number of votes in at least ten precincts in
Cleveland, such as one that had cast eight votes for third party
candidates in the 2000 election, but cast (in addition to 290 votes
for Kerry and 21 for Bush) 215 votes for Constitution Party
20 1
candidate Michael Peroutka.
Fourth, the recounts suffered from a number of deficiencies.
Recounts in Ohio require county boards of elections initially to
compare a hand count with the machine count for a three percent
sample of the votes. 20 2 If there is a discrepancy, the entire county
must be counted by hand; otherwise it can be recounted by
machine. 20 3 In violation of these rules, many county boards of
elections did not randomly select the precinct samples 20 4 and
others failed to undertake a full recount even when the initial
20 5
hand and machine counts did not match.
Also disturbing was the role in the recount played by vendor
Triad GSI, whose program tallying punch-card votes was used in
forty-one of Ohio's eighty-eight counties in the election. 20 6 In
Hocking County, for example, an elections official explained in an
affidavit that an employee of Triad came to the county board of
elections "to check out [the] tabulator [and] computer."20 7 He
then went to the computer that was being used for the recount
199Richard Hayes Phillips, Hacking the Vote in Miami County, FREE PRESS,
Dec. 25, 2004, http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2004/1038.
200 Id.
201 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 55-56; see also Juan Gonzalez,
Ohio Tally Fit for Ukraine, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Nov. 30, 2004, at 22.
202 See PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 21 & n.61.
203 Id. at 21.
204 See PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 92-93 (noting that samples
were not randomly selected in Allen, Clermont, Cuyahoga, Morrow, Hocking,
Medina, and Vinton counties).
205 Id. at 94-95 (noting such activity in Fairfield, Monroe, and Lucas counties).
206 Ohio Election Workers Scrutinize Ballots to Determine Voters' Intent, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 16, 2004, at A04; see also PRESERVING DEMOCRACY,
supra note 156, at 86-87. Also of concern is that the Rapp family, which founded and
controls Triad, has been a consistent contributor to the Republican Party.
PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 86-87.
207 Letter of Rep. John Conyers, Jr. to Kevin R. Brock & Larry E. Beal,
enclosing Affidavit of Sherole Eaton dated Dec. 13, 2004 (Dec. 15, 2004), availableat
http://www.house.gov/judiciary-democrats/brockbealohelecltrl2l5O4.pdf.
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and announced that "the battery.., was dead and that the
stored information was gone," and that "he could put a patch on
it and fix it."208 The employee took apart the computer that was
being used for the recount, "asked ...which precinct and the
number of the precinct we were going to count ...[and then]
went back into the tabulation room." 20 9 Before leaving, the Triad
employee urged the election officials to "post a 'cheat sheet' on
the wall.. . so the count would come out perfect and we wouldn't
have to do a full hand recount of the county." 210 Triad officials
intervened in the recounts in several other counties, with one
official admitting to altering tabulating software in at least six
211
counties.
In short, given the ease, potential magnitude, and lack of
transparency of fraud in the computerized recording and
counting of the vote, circumstantial evidence is more important
than ever. After examining the exit polls, pre-election polls, and
occurrences in Ohio, it is clear that circumstantial evidence
raises significant questions concerning the accuracy of the vote
count in the 2004 elections.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
As Part II showed, there are considerable problems with the
counting of the vote in the United States today. This section
offers recommendations that would dramatically improve the
accuracy, integrity, and transparency of the vote counting
process. The majority of the recommendations focus on the
technology that is in most dire need of improvement: electronic
voting.
First, and most important, is the need for legislation
requiring voter-verified paper ballots for DREs. Although many
states have recently enacted such legislation, 2 2 Congress must
21 3
act to ensure that every state requires an audit trail.
208
209
210

Id.
Id.
Id.

211 PRESERVING DEMOCRACY, supra note 156, at 81.
212 Robert
Kibrick,
Voter-Verified
Paper
Record
Legislation,
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.php?list=type&type=13 (last visited July 23,
2005).
213 Two of the strongest bills currently being considered are the Voter
Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005, H.R. 550, 109th Cong. (2005),
and the Voting Integrity and Verification Act of 2005, S. 330, 109th Cong. (2005).
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As the 2004 election showed, the absence of a paper trail
precludes recounts and prevents scrutiny of phantom votes,
undervotes, suspicious voter turnouts, and disappearing votes.
Redoing elections-as was recently done in North Carolina
because of the disappearance of votes 214-should not be the
primary option that it is when we lack the capability to conduct
recounts.
Nor should voters be forced to rely on vendors'
assertions that elections run "flawlessly."2 15 Considering the
documented vulnerabilities of DREs and their susceptibility to
switched, deleted, and added votes, the inability to verify the vote
is unjustifiable.
One potential technology that could provide an audit trail
involves cryptography. For example, the company VoteHere has
invented a technology that gives voters an encrypted receipt that
allows them to verify that their ballot was counted. 216 It also
envisions a verification of the vote count through a
randomization algorithm. 21 7 Such a system holds the promise of
not only allowing recounts but also verifying the accuracy of the
initial counting of the vote. Despite its promise, however, it is
extremely complex, not yet widely understood by computer
218
science researchers, and not transparent to the typical voter.
For that reason, the best choice currently is a paper trail. A
paper trail offers advantages not provided by other technologies.
Paper offers a permanent record, allows voters to verify the
contents of the ballot without relying on a computer, and
provides understandable procedures for poll workers and voters
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Amy Morenz, Electronic Voting Divides County Political Leaders,
Sept. 20, 2004, available at http://votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2848 (quoting
Diebold spokesman David Bear, who stated: "The system has performed flawlessly;
there has never been a factual security issue . . . after hundreds of elections").
216 Voter Verification and Audit Work Together, http://www.votehere.net/
privatevoterverification.php (last visited July 23, 2005).
217 Richard Barnes, VoteHere VHTi: A Verifiable E-Voting Protocol (Feb. 3,
2004), http://www.cs.virginia.edu/-evans/crab/VoteHere.pdf.
218 David L. Dill, Electronic Voting: An Overview of the Problem, VERIFIED
2005,
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/
VOTING
FOUND.,
Apr.
18,
Voting,
Rebecca
Mercuri,
Electronic
article.php?id=5731;
see
also
http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html (last visited July 23, 2005) ('Many
vendors and some scientists believe that an audit trail of electronically recorded
ballots can be made secure (possibly through encryption... ), but no such systems
have yet been validated through rigorous mathematical proofs, nor can they be
independently confirmed for correctness by non-technical poll workers, election
officials or ordinary citizens.").
214

215
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(all while not preventing voters with disabilities from voting). 219
Fully ninety-five percent of the members of the largest
professional organization of computer scientists 220 agreed with
the statement that DREs must provide a physical record of the
221
vote.
One version of a "paper trail" involves a DRE that produces a
paper ballot that appears under glass and is deposited into a
lockbox after being reviewed by a voter. 222 During the 2004
presidential election Sequoia DREs allowed voters in Nevada to
utilize such a technology. 22 3 Other examples of DREs with voterverified paper records include the Avante Vote-Trakker 224 and
225
the AccuPoll.
Second, there should be mandatory audits of the vote count.
The vulnerabilities and performance of DREs reveal that it is at
219 Dill, supra note 218 (noting that arguments against paper ballots made by
advocates for voters with disabilities ignore equipment that makes optical scan
ballots accessible to voters with disabilities and nonspeakers of English and fail to
recognize that touch-screen machines with paper trails are as accessible as machines
without such a trail); see also Dill, supra note 46 (commenting that the arguments
raised by the advocates "idealize the accessibility of existing touch-screen machines,
which fail to accommodate some kinds of disabilities, and often disappoint even
those voters with the specific disabilities for which they were designed").
220 About ACM, http://www.acm.org/about-acm (last visited July 23, 2005)
("ACM is the world's oldest and largest educational and scientific computing
society.").
221 Majority of Members Polled Agree with ACM E-Voting Policy Statement,
(Sept.
2004),
http://campus.acm.org/public/membernet/storypage-2.cfm?ci=
September_2004&announcement=l&CFID=43550501&CFTOKEN=35036872.
In
the event of a discrepancy between the paper count and machine count, the former
should take priority since it provides more tangible evidence of the voter's intent.
222 E.g., REBECCA MERCURI, FACTS ABOUT VOTER VERIFIED PAPER BALLOTS
(2004), available at http://www.notablesoftware.com/Papers/VVPBFacts.pdf;
EVoting With a Paper Trail, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 24, 2004, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0924/p08s02-comv.htm. The voter need not receive a
"receipt" of their vote, as such a document could be used in vote-selling schemes.
223 See Press Release, Nev. Sec'y of State, Heller Invites Nation to View
Nevada's V-Pat Printer in Action (July 23, 2005), http://secretaryofstate.biz
press/072904.htm.
224 Avante
VOTE-TRAKKER
Overview,
http://www.vote-trakker.coml
overview.html (last visited July 23, 2005) (explaining that paper record
"incorporates a random voting session identifier" and divides the papers into
individual records without identifying information such as time-stamps).
225 Voter
Verified
Paper
Audit
Trail,
http://www.accupoll.com/
TheAccuPollAdvantage/Brochures/vvpat.pdf (last visited July 23, 2005) (stating that
a voter, after casting an electronic ballot, examines a paper record of the vote and
deposits it in a ballot box). For a listing of the drawbacks of paper trails, see
FISCHER, supra note 49, at 28-29 (mentioning increased complication, cost, and risk
of mechanical failure).
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least conceivable that error or fraud could affect the vote count to
such an extent that the winning margin would be greater than
that needed to trigger a recount. A random check of a certain
percentage of ballots-regardless of the official margin of
victory-would provide added assurance that the vote count is
accurate. California, for example, requires a hand recount of one
percent of the ballots cast in an election, 226 and a bill recently
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives would require a
recount of two percent. 227 Requiring audits in all elections would
expose errors and avoid the politicized nature of recounts in close
additional
races. And performing this task in public would offer
228
benefits for bolstering confidence in the vote count.
Third, more documentation is necessary at the local level.
Votes should be compiled and publicly posted at precincts before
In
being transmitted to central tabulating computers. 229
particular, the number of voters should be compared to the
number of ballots cast, and the official count should be crossreferenced to the posted precinct results. 230 Such practices would
reduce the likelihood of widespread fraud, such as tampering
with the central tabulators. Relatedly, voting machines should
not have telephone, wireless, or Internet connections and should
231
not transmit results by modem.
Fourth, the security of the machines and software should be
strengthened. Voting machines need to be protected at all times
and-unlike the 16,000 DREs in Maryland that had identical
232
locks-seals and locks on the machines must be made secure.
"Chain of custody" procedures should be implemented, and audit
logs listing every individual who accessed the machine should be
226 KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, HARVARD UNIV., VOTING, VOTE CAPTURE & VOTE
COUNTING SYMPOSIUM:

ELECTRONIC VOTING BEST PRACTICES:

A

SUMMARY

(2004), available at http://designforvalues.org/voting/votingABP-final.pdf.

25

227 Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005, H.R. 550, 109th
Cong. § 5 (2005).
228 Alexander, supra note 45 (noting that only two states-California and West
Virginia-require that computerized vote counts be publicly verified).
229 See Editorial, Insurance for Electronic Votes, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, § A,
at 22 (recommending precinct and online posting).
230 Kim Alexander, Ten Things Elections Officials Can Do To Secure the Vote
this November (Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.calvoter.org/issues/votingtech/
pub/081904KAsecurevote.html (recommending comparison of number of voters and
ballots).
231 See id.
232 RABA REPORT, supra note 59, at 18 (Maryland DREs); Zetter, supra note 57
(describing dangers of leaving machines unattended).
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created and retained after each election. 233 Finally, states should
ensure that the version of software used during the election
matches the version that has been certified.
Fifth, the certification process itself needs to be upgraded.
Most of the vote-counting software used today is tested against
standards from 1990, which fail to cover many problems that
have been detected in the past fifteen years. 234 The testing of
software and machines should include activity such as "parallel
monitoring" and "red team attacks." Parallel monitoring would,
by testing randomly-selected machines throughout Election Day
to see if the test votes match the machine votes, reveal machines
that are programmed to perform differently in a test setting than
in an election setting. 235 A red-team attack would involve
simulations in which professionals "attempt to subvert a mock
election" and would tend to illustrate vulnerabilities that might
otherwise go unnoticed. 236 Finally, the certification process must
be made more transparent, so that it is not conducted in secret
and not reliant on the approval and funding of the vendors. 237
Sixth, the software itself should be subject to public scrutiny.
Because the vendors treat the voting system software as
proprietary and do not allow its inspection, there is a complete
lack of transparency. 238 Voters and election officials cannot
ascertain how votes are recorded or counted and cannot expose
bugs or malicious code. This lack of openness is especially
dangerous in voting machines, which-unlike other softwarecannot trace outputs such as ballots to inputs such as voter
decisions. 239 Open source software, in contrast, would allow
233 CALTECHIMIT VOTING TECHNOLOGY PROJECT, IMMEDIATE STEPS TO AVOID
LOST VOTES IN THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE

ELECTION
ASSISTANCE
COMMISSION
3
(2004),
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/media/documents/EAC.pdf.
234 CALTECHIMIT STUDY, supra note 17, at 72.
235

available

at

DOUGLAS W. JONES, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS

IN MIAMI-DADE

COUNTY USING

THE

ES&S

IVOTRONIC

SYSTEM

§

7(c) (2004),

http://www.cs.uiowa.edu/-jones/voting/miami.pdf.
236

ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., ACCESSIBILITY AND AUDITABILITY IN ELECTRONIC

VOTING 4 (2004), http://www.eff.org/e-vote/e-vote-white_paper-20040517.pdf.
237 See KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, supra note 226, at 20.
238 See JONES, supra note 235, at 5 (explaining that DREs have been described
as "black box voting systems" because "observers can do very little to assure
themselves that the software and mechanism inside the voting machine performs
correctly").
239 Philip H. Albert, A Vote for Open-Source Voting Machines, LINUXINSIDER,
Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/A-Vote-for-Open-Source-Voting-
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many experts to examine vote counting systems, which would
240 To pick
increase the likelihood of discovering security flaws.
one example, the Open Voting Consortium is developing a PCbased open source voting machine that is intended to run on a
Linux-type operating system. 241 At a minimum, even if the
vendors treat the user interface as proprietary, the source code
for the vote recording and vote counting processes should be
open.

242

Enacting each of these changes would increase confidence
243 If these changes
that DREs are accurately counting the vote.
are not undertaken, then the acute vulnerabilities of DREs would
counsel against their continued use. Instead, precinct-based
optical scan systems would present a more reliable option.244
Such machines provide feedback to the voter-and thus have low
residual vote rates-and a built-in paper trail. They are cheaper
than DREs, and some versions offer access to voters with
245
Of course, the
disabilities, thus complying with HAVA.
Machines-37753.html.
240
241

WITH

KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV'T, supra note 226, at 21.
ARTHUR M. KELLER ET AL., A PC-BASED OPEN-SOURCE VOTING MACHINE
AN ACCESSIBLE VOTER-VERIFIABLE PAPER BALLOT 6, available at

(last visited
http://www.nationalacademies.org/cstb/project-evoting-keller-ovc.pdf
July 23, 2005).
242 CALTECH/MIT STUDY, supra note 17 at 46; FISCHER, supra note 49, at 27
("The code used for vote casting and counting can be much simpler than that needed
for the voter interface," because the latter is "where innovations can provide the
greatest advances in usability and other benefits for voters, and the security
requirements are not as stringent."); MICHAEL IAN SHAMOS, PAPER V. ELECTRONIC
RECORDS-AN ASSESSMENT § 3.2 (2004), available at http://www.electiontech.org

downloads/Paper vs Electronic.pdf (last visited July 23, 2005) ("The author has been
looking at the source codes of voting systems for over 20 years and has yet to find
any significant differences in their design except possibly for the number of bugs
they contain.").
243 Several bills currently being considered by Congress would satisfy many of
these goals. See, e.g., Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2005, H.R.
550, 109th Cong. (2005) (requiring voter-verified paper ballots, mandatory manual
audits, increased security, and disclosed software); Voting Integrity and Verification
Act of 2005, S.330, 109th Cong. (2005) (requiring voter-verified paper ballots and
providing that these ballots are the official ballots in the event of discrepancies).
244 Punch cards and lever machines are not preferred options because of the
uniquely high residual vote rates with the former and lack of an audit trail with the
latter. The use of paper ballots has continually declined in the past century, but if
the suggestions I recommend for DREs are not enacted, paper ballots would provide
a more reliable option.
245 See Automark Technical Systems, http://www.automarkts.com (last visited
July 23, 2005) (describing system that can be used by blind, vision-impaired, limitedmobility, and non-English-speaking voters); see also Dill, supra note 218 (noting that
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centralized counting of optical scan ballots introduces some of the
same concerns as with DREs, but at least there is more
transparency and a tangible record of the voter's intent.
Finally, legislators and county officials should be open to
new technologies. Hybrid systems that combine the speed of
electronic tabulation with the reliability of paper ballots promise
to remedy some of the most acute vulnerabilities of DREs. The
Populex system, for example, uses a touch screen that prevents
overvotes and warns the voter of undervotes. 246 But unlike other
DREs, it prints a voter-verifiable paper ballot card containing a
bar code that is scanned to record and count the votes and that
serves as the official ballot. 247 The system also can be used by
blind, visually impaired, and non-English-speaking voters. 248
CONCLUSION
Imagine, as computer scientists have recently analogized,
that voters privately dictated their votes to human scribes but
could not inspect the work of the scribes. 249 Such a system would
not inspire confidence because no one would know if the scribes
misrecorded votes. But that is the type of system we have, with
computers "designed and programmed by people who are no more
reliable than [the] hypothetical scribes." 250
Voters in previous generations at least could witness boxes of
paper ballots suddenly materializing and could know the
magnitude of the fraud based on the number of suspicious
ballots. Today's software, in contrast, is characterized by a lack
of transparency, an inability to prevent vote switching and the
deletion of evidence of tampering, and a far-reaching scope due to
the removal of physical components of the vote count.
A voter could never know, for example, that a backdoor was
used in a county's central tabulator to alter millions of votes. Or
that the ability of a few to gain access to an insecure system with
passwords that have been known for years could forever
DREs "cost at least three times as much as optical scan systems to purchase").
246 Populex
Digital Paper Ballot System, at http://www.populex.coml
DPBFeatures.htm (last visited July 23, 2005).
247 Populex
Digital
Paper
Ballot
System,
http://www.populex.com/
DPBIntro.htm (last visited July 23, 2005).
248 Id.
Another similar system is the AutoMARK Voter Assist Terminal. See
Automark Technical Systems, supra note 245.
249 Dill, supra note 218.
250 Id.
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compromise the integrity of the vote. The fact that we have not
found such backdoors does not mean they do not exist. More
likely, it means that their very nature makes them less (if at all)
discoverable.
And it means that the existence of circumstantial evidence
such as surprising results, incorrect exit polls, and blocked
recounts takes on more significance than it otherwise might. At
a minimum, the mere possibility that such widespread, largely
undetectable fraud could take place, together with the ease with
which it could happen, warrants significantly more attention to
the process of how our votes are counted today.
In the aftermath of the 2000 election, many, including
Congress, viewed technology as a savior. Before assuming that
role, however, electronic voting must be strengthened with a
voter-verified paper trail, random audits, open source software,
and the other recommendations I propose. Only then can voters
have confidence that technology's promise will match its perils.
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